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The
time has come to put the brakes on the right of publicity.
The action has overflowed its intended banks and is swamping
all that lies before it, including the First Amendment.
Curiously, most of the damage is being done by the Ninth
Circuit, purporting to apply California law. With one
notable recent exception, the Ninth Circuit has upheld
every single right of publicity claim to come before it,
so that the simplest way to summarize the right of publicity
is that there is a prima facie case any time anybody
uses anyone's name, likeness, or voice (or imitation thereof)
for any reason. Note the breadth of the action: anyone
can be a plaintiff, not just celebrities. Also, the right
applies to any use, not just a commercial use. It does
not even require the use of the plaintiff's actual name,
likeness, or voice (referred to herein as "persona");
liability can be based on use of the plaintiff's nickname
or a "look-alike" or voice imitation.
All
states recognize the right of publicity as a common-law
right. Many states have statutes dealing with the right
of publicity, but these statutes are usually in addition
to, and not in lieu of, the common-law right (New
York being one notable exception). Thus, plaintiffs usually
get the benefit of the broader of the two rights (statutory
or common law).
The
fundamental problem with the right of publicity is that
currently there is no principled set of defenses that
apply, so defendants are often left "defenseless." This
is in sharp contrast to most other torts, where the law
has developed a set of standard defenses that may apply.
To take only one example, for slander there are the defenses
that the statement was (a) truthful, (b) privileged, or
(c) mere opinion. Unfortunately, the law has simply not
developed to this extent for the right of publicity, so
the rare cases holding in favor of the defendants do so
on an ad-hoc and inconsistent basis. The purpose of this
article is to suggest a uniform set of defenses to a right
of publicity claim.
The
current broad application of the right of publicity has
given celebrities the unilateral right to stop any remote
or indirect reference to them; a result that is simply
not intended or justified under any theory. For better
or worse, celebrities have become woven into our cultural
fabric, so to excise every reference to celebrities' personas
would effectively overrule the First Amendment. Thus,
a uniform set of defenses to right of publicity claims
is a critical bulwark to defending the First Amendment.
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A.
Incidental Use.
For
starters, there should be no liability for the mere incidental
use of plaintiff's persona. For example, a twenty seven-second
"clip" of plaintiff's singing performance and a single
mention of his name in a movie was held not actionable
because it was an incidental use. [1] Similarly,
a brief discussion of plaintiff in a book is not actionable.
[2] The California statute recognizing
the right of publicity contains its own incidental use
concept, which permits the use of any photograph, videotape,
etc., of a person as part of a "definable group," including,
without limitation, a crowd, audience, club, or team,
as long as the individual has not been singled out in
any manner. [3] This is a useful application
of the incidental use concept and should be incorporated
by case law into the common law, just as the common law
incidental use concept has been incorporated by case law
into the statute. [4]
Although
the incidental use concept should be interpreted broadly,
a defendant should not be able to create an incidental
use simply by engaging in multiple uses. For example,
the face of a baseball player on a baseball card should
not be an incidental use merely because there are a large
number of cards (each with a different face).
B.
No Actual Use.
There
should be no liability when there is no actual use or
direct imitation of plaintiff's persona, as any implied
association would then be too tenuous. This defense is
analogous to the idea/expression doctrine developed under
the Copyright Act. Under this doctrine, the Copyright
Act applies to prevent the unauthorized use of the expression
of an idea, but it does not apply to prevent the unauthorized
use of the idea itself. [5] This doctrine
is essential to protecting the free flow of ideas, an
essential element to the fabric of our society and a necessary
concomitant to developing and improving on prior ideas.
To date, the right of publicity cases have permitted liability
based on any indirect invocation of plaintiff's persona.
Application of the idea/expression doctrine would protect
any publication that did not involve the actual use or
direct imitation of someone's persona. [6]
A drawing showing the features of the plaintiff would
be actionable, even if highly stylized. [7]
On the other hand, the mere fact that the plaintiff's
persona is called to mind by reason of association should
not be actionable. For example, any reference to the film
"Terminator II" is likely to automatically call to mind
Arnold Schwarzenegger, but such an indirect association
should not be actionable. Were it otherwise, the free
flow of ideas would be ground to a halt by those whose
personas have any association to the ideas.
The
most egregious case of this to date is the decision holding
that Samsung violated Vanna White's right of publicity
by an advertisement showing a robot in an evening gown
spinning the "Wheel of Fortune." [8]
Other than the evening gown, which is not an element of
persona, the robot bore no resemblance to Vanna White,
so only the "idea" of Vanna White had been used. Since
any reference to the show, "Wheel of Fortune," will almost
always call to mind Vanna White, the court effectively
granted her the exclusive right to any commercial reference
to the show. Similarly, another case held that an advertiser
violated a race car driver's right of publicity by using
a highly modified photograph of his racing car in a cigarette
advertisement.[9] Neither the driver
nor his name could be seen, so this use should not have
been actionable. Yet another case held that a manufacturer
of portable toilets named "Here's Johnny" violated Johnny
Carson's right of publicity. [10] While
the phrase, "Here's Johnny," certainly calls to mind Johnny
Carson, it is because of his famous introduction, not
his name. For example, a portable toilet simply called
"Johnny" would probably not invoke the association to
Johnny Carson to the average person. Thus, it is idea
association from his introduction, not the use of his
name, that invokes the association to Johnny Carson. In
all these cases, because of the tenuous link to the plaintiff,
the public would not think that there is any actual association
between the plaintiff and the product, so there should
be no liability.
To
a large extent, this suggested idea/expression dichotomy
may have been adapted by the California Supreme Court
in 2001, but in a different guise. [11]
The court held that the First Amendment protected "transformative"
works reflecting "significant transformative elements"
to the plaintiff's image, such as the famous Andy Warhol
portraits of celebrities. [12] This
case dealt with images on t-shirts, and it is not clear
whether it applies to advertising, although logically
it should. This case is discussed in more detail below.
C.
First Amendment.
1.
Matters of Public Interest.
The
Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment provides
an absolute defense to publication-based tort actions
for publications on matters of public interest, unless
the publications contain knowing or reckless falsehood.
[13] This protection applies to a broad
range of publications, including magazine articles, [14]
books, [15] and movies. [16]
Advertisements, however, are not matters of public interest,
so they do not qualify for this defense.[17]
In
order to provide broad First Amendment protection, the
definition of "public interest" sweeps up any publication
regarding public figures and celebrities[18],
as well as publications regarding private citizens who
become associated with some issue that has caught the
public eye. [19] For example, the defense
has been extended to protect a photograph in a magazine
of a couple in a romantic pose as within the ambit of
public interest as entertainment. [20]
In
one remarkable case (particularly for the Ninth Circuit),
the Ninth Circuit held that the First Amendment protected
a fashion article in Los Angeles Magazine where Dustin
Hoffman's cross-dressing character from "Tootsie" was
re-dressed in attire from another designer that just happened
to advertise in that edition of the magazine. [21]
Without discussion, the court seemed to assume that the
article qualified as a matter of public interest. More
remarkably, the court held that the intentional re-dressing
of Dustin Hoffman was not a knowing falsehood because
reasonable readers would know from the context of the
article that the magazine had done it by computer. There
are several issues left open by the court's decision:
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Does
the decision only apply when there is some accompanying
text or discussion? Did the case simply assume that
the minimal discussion of fashion qualified as a matter
of public interest, or were the photos themselves the
matter of public interest? Since the topic of the article
(new fashions) had nothing to do with Dustin Hoffman,
it appears that no accompanying text or discussion is
required.
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If
NO accompanying text or discussion is required,
would the case permit a picture book of celebrities?
Although the case dealt with a magazine, what about
celebrity pictures on posters or t-shirts? What about
celebrity pictures on a restaurant wall?
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What is somewhat disturbing is the treatment of the
photograph of the celebrity as almost per se a matter
of public interest. [22] This would
seem to permit open hunting season on celebrities. Why
do magazines need models anymore? They will just cut
and paste Cindy Crawford into the latest fashions, with
small print saying "we did this by computer."
The
statutory provisions recognizing the right of publicity
provide a defense for use of someone's persona in connection
with any "news," [23] which has been
interpreted to be at least as broad as, if not broader
than, the First Amendment protection for publications
on matters of public interest. [24] The
definition of "news" within the statute has been interpreted
similar to the First Amendment defense by excluding publications
that were knowingly or recklessly false.
[25]
There
are limitations on the First Amendment defense for publications
on matters of public interest. The Supreme Court has held
that an unauthorized television news broadcast of an entire
human cannonball act was not protected, because it caused
a substantial threat to the economic value of the performance.
[26]
2.
Parodies.
The
Supreme Court has held that a parody, even a highly offensive
one, of a public figure is protected by the First Amendment,
except in the unusual case where a reasonable person would
believe that the parody expresses a statement of fact,
and the fact is untrue. [27] Although
the decision dealt with an action for intentional infliction
of emotional distress, the result would have to be the
same for a right of publicity action, or the decision
would be toothless. [28] In order to
be protected, the parody should relate directly to the
plaintiff; it should not be enough that the plaintiff's
persona is used in connection with a parody of something
other than the plaintiff, or the defense would become
too broad.
3.
Works of Fiction.
Some
courts have held that there is First Amendment protection
for works of fiction. This is so even though one case
involved a fictional story based around Valentino's life,
[29] and another story contained a ten-year
old character referred to as "Squints Palledorous," which
vaguely resembled the plaintiff, Michael Polydoros, thirty
years earlier. [30]
4.
"Transformative" Works.
In
an extremely important decision rendered in 2001, the
California Supreme Court held that the conflict between
the First Amendment and the right of publicity required
a "balancing of interests." [31] The
Court held that pictures or paintings, without accompanying
text or discussion, even on merchandise, were protected
by the First Amendment against a right of publicity claim,
but only for "transformative" works that reflected "significant
transformative elements" to the plaintiff's image, such
as the famous Andy Warhol portraits of celebrities.[32]
The decision was long on words but short on logic
and left unanswered a number of questions, including the
following:
-
What
if a "transformative" image is used to advertise a product?
For example, does this case overrule the Vanna White
decision and its progeny?
-
Does
the same rationale apply to works that use the plaintiff's
name or voice?
D.
Express or Implied Consent.
Another
defense to the publication-based tort actions is if the
plaintiff gives express or implied consent to the publication.
[33] Express consent is straightforward,
but implied consent should be interpreted broadly based
on the expectations of a reasonable person in the circumstances.
For example, actors in a movie should be held to implicitly
consent to use of their personas in advertisements for
the movie, just as those who pose for a picture should
be held to implicitly consent to an intended use of the
picture that they were aware of at the time. Similarly,
those who become advisory or honorary members of a board
of directors of a charitable organization should be held
to implicitly consent to a listing of their name and capacity
in an advertisement by the charitable organization. In
addition, athletes in a game that they know is being televised
should be held to implicitly consent to the televised
broadcast and any subsequent broadcasts, outtakes, etc.,
that are within the reasonable contemplation of the athletes
at the outset.
E.
Privileged.
Another
defense to a right of publicity claim should be that the
publication is legally privileged, as when it occurs in
the context of a legislative, judicial, or administrative
proceeding. [34]
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Some
defendants have argued for, and some cases have applied,
improper defenses to right of publicity actions. This
section of this article analyzes these purported defenses
to demonstrate why they should not be applicable.
A.
Copyright Act Preemption.
In
a blatantly wrong decision, the Seventh Circuit held
that the Copyright Act preempted a right of publicity
claim by baseball players objecting to televised broadcasts
of their games. [35] In reaching
its decision, the court held that the players were
the "authors" of the televised games within the meaning
of the Copyright Act. However, the "author" of a televised
game is the company that films the game. [36]
The players were not the "authors" of the work;
they were the subject of the work.
The
Copyright Act protects authors and owners of a work,
while the right of publicity protects the subjects
of a work. The Copyright Act and the right of publicity
protect entirely different interests, so Copyright
Act preemption does not apply. For example, the Supreme
Court has held that the unauthorized broadcast of
an entire cannonball act was a violation of the right
of publicity, even though the broadcaster undoubtedly
owned the copyright to the broadcast.[37]
Similarly, the courts have held that plaintiffs
are not preempted by the Copyright Act to object to
the imitation of their voice in a song on a commercial,
even if the defendant has the valid right to use the
words and music to the song under the Copyright Act.
[38] Therefore, Copyright Act preemption should
not have been a defense to the baseball players' cause
of action; however, the case should have been decided
the same way based on implied consent, discussed above.
B.
Disclaimers.
Some
commercials imitate celebrity voices and end with
the disclaimer, "celebrity voices impersonated." If
such disclaimers were allowed as a defense, the right
of publicity would be eviscerated; for example, an
advertiser could use a perfect imitation of the plaintiff's
voice in a song in any commercial, and would rely
on a disclaimer as a defense. This can not be allowed.
C.
Fair Use.
It
is also tempting to suggest a "fair use" defense based
on analogy to copyright or trademark law.
[39] Both copyright law and trademark law, however,
are based on the commercial concept of encouraging
maximum effort for the overall good of society, and
they both address economic, not personal, injury.
Since the right of publicity protects different interests,
the fair use analogy is not a good one.
[40] The concerns addressed by a fair use defense,
however, are addressed by the defenses set forth in
this article, which should provide adequate breathing
room for the free marketplace of ideas.
D.
Non-Celebrities.
In a right of publicity action, the harm to the plaintiff
is a personal one. Many courts phrase the right of
publicity as the exclusive right to exploit one's
persona and to prevent others from doing so without
payment. [41] This formulation puts
a demonstrably commercial spin on the right and suggests
economic, not personal, injury. This commercial formulation,
however, overlooks the ultimate source of the right,
which is the personal "right to be let alone."
Even in the classic case of a celebrity bringing the
action for the commercial use of the celebrity's persona,
the facts frequently state that the dispute is not
for lack of payment; the celebrity is often offended
by any commercial use of their persona.
[42] It is for this reason that the right of publicity
should not be limited to celebrities or public figures,
and should apply as well to private citizens.
[43]
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The
real problem with right of publicity cases is that merely
to be sued is to lose, even if the defendant ultimately
wins the case, because of the legal fees incurred to defend
the case and the threat of almost limitless liability.
Because of the muddy law in this area, these cases are
almost never resolved at the summary judgment stage. The
mantra of most publishers and film companies has thus
become, "When in doubt, leave it out," resulting in a
real hit to the First Amendment. This article suggests
a set of uniform defenses to right of publicity claims.
Since these defenses turn on questions of law, they are
particularly appropriate to be applied at the summary
judgment stage, thus ending the real problem with right
of publicity claims and reducing the chilling effect the
specter of these claims has on freedom of expression.
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1
Brown v. Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corporation, 799 F.Supp. 166 (D.C.D.C. 1992).
Also see Namath v. Sports Illustrated, 48
A.D.2d 487 (1975) ("Use of plaintiff's photograph was
merely incidental advertising of defendant's magazine
in which plaintiff had earlier been properly and fairly
depicted"), aff'd without op., 352 N.E.2d 584 (1976).
2
Johnson v. Harcourt,
Brace,Jovanovich, Inc., 43 Cal.App.3d 880 (1974).
3
Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(b).
4
Johnson v. Harcourt, Brace,Jovanovich,
Inc., 43 Cal.App.3d 880 (1974).
5
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Entrerprises,
105 S.Ct. 2218 (1985).
6
Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable
Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983) ("Carson's
identity may be exploited even if his name, John W. Carson,
or his picture is not used"); Motschenbacher v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir.1974)(use
of highly modified photograph of plaintiff's race car
was actionable); White v. Samsung Electronics America,
Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir.1992), cert. denied,
113 S.Ct. 2443 (1993)(advertisement with robot in evening
gown spinning the "Wheel of Fortune" was actionable);
Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 125 F.3rd (9th Cir.
1997)(mannequins of characters from "Cheers" in airport
bar were actionable). For a refreshing step back, see
Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. 227 F.3d 619
(6th Cir. 200)(disapproving of White v. Samsung,
and holding that at least a less known actor did not have
a valid claim with respect to toy figure based on character
he played but that had no personal resemblance to actor).
7
Ali v. Playgirl, Inc.,
447 F.Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)(cartoon drawing of Muhammad
Ali).
8
White v. Samsung Electronics
America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S.Ct. 2443 (1993).
9
Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
10
Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets,
Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
11
Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary
Saderup, Inc., 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126 (Cal.Sp.Ct. 2001).
12
Contrast Ali v. Playgirl, Inc.,
447 F.Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (Mohammad Ali's right
of publicity violated by highly stylized cartoon).
13
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 94
S.Ct. 2997 (1974)(defamation); Time, Inc. v. Hill,
87 S.Ct.534 (1967)(public disclosure of private facts).
14
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 87 S.Ct. 534
(1967).
15
Maheu v. CBS, Inc., 201 Cal.App.3d
662 (1988).
16
Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions,
25 Cal.3d 860 (1979); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d
994 (2d Cir. 1989).
17
Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp.,
85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1996). Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC,
Inc., 255 F. 3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001).
18
New York Times v. Sullivan, 84
S.Ct. 710 (1964)(defamation). Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC,
Inc., 255 F. 3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001). But see, Ali
v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F.Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(holding that a cartoon in a magazine was not "news" because
the cartoon itself had no "newsworthy dimension").
19
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 87 S.Ct. 534
(1967)(article about crime victims); Dora v. Frontline
Video, Inc., 15 Cal.App.4th 536 (1993)(documentary
on surfers); Howell v. New York Post, 612 N.E.
2d 699 (N.Y. 1993)(photograph of well-known person, with
plaintiff at her side, at psychiatric hospital).
20
Gill v. Hearst Pub. Co., 40 Cal.2d
224 (1953).
21
Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.,
255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001).
22
Contrast Ali v Playgirl, Inc.,
447 F.Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)(holding that a cartoon
in a magazine was not "news" because the cartoon itself
had no "newsworthy dimension").
23
See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(d).
24
Maheu v. CBS, Inc., 201 Cal.App.3d
662 (1988); Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal.App.3d
409 (1983); Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., 15 Cal.App.4th
536 (1993); New Kids on the Block v. New America Pub.,
Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992).
25
Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal.App.3d 409
(1983).
26
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting
Co., 97 S.Ct. 2849 (1977).
27
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,
108 S.Ct. 876 (1988)(highly offensive cartoon of religious
leader).
28
San Francisco Bay Guardian, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 17 Cal.App.4th 655 (1993)(applying
parody defense to defamation claim); Cardtoons, L.C.
v. Major League Baseball Players Association, 95 F.3d
959 (10th Cir. 1996)(applying parody defense to right
of publicity claim).
29
Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions,
25 Cal.3d 860 (1979).
30
Polydoros v. Twentieth Century Fox,
67 Cal.App. 4th 318 (1997).
31
Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary
Saderup, Inc., 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 126 (Cal.Sp.Ct.2001).
32
Contrast Ali v. Playgirl, Inc.,
447 F.Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)(Mohammad Ali's right of
publicity violated by highly stylized cartoon).
33
Kapellas v. Kofman, 1 Cal. 3d
20 (1969).
34
See, e.g., Cal.Civ.Code § 47 (for
defamation).
35
Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League
Baseball Players Assoc., 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 1593 (1987).
36
17 U.S.C.§ 201(b).
37
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting
Co., 97 S.Ct. 2849 (1977).
38
Midler v. Ford Motor Company,
849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988); Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc.,
978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct.
1047 (1993).
39
17 U.S.C. § 107 (copyright); 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (trademark).
40
The California Supreme Court has
come to the same conclusion but based on inapplicability
of Copyright Law. Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary
Saderup, Inc., 2-6 Cal.Rptr.2d 126 (Cal.Sp.Ct.2001).
41
Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary
Saderup, Inc., 106 Cal.Rptr. 126 (Cal.Sp.Ct. 2001).
42
E.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc.,
978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113
S.Ct. 1047 (1993).
43
Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equipment
Co., 138 Cal.App.2d 82 (1955) (a private citizen has
a cause of action if they are listed, without consent,
as endorsing a particular product); Stilson v. Reader's
Digest Assn, Inc., 28 Cal.App.3d 270 (1972), cert
denied, 93 S.Ct. 1928 (1973)(listing sweepstake finalists
without permission); Maheu v. CBS, Inc., 201 Cal.App.3d
662 (1988)(assumed without discussion); Howell v. New
York Post, 612 N.E.2d 699 (N.Y. 1993). But see Brewer
v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 749 F.2d 527 (9th Cir.
1984)(stating that the right applies only to celebrities);
Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619
(6th Cir. 2000)(same, and see cases cited therein at p.
624)
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